Economic Security in an Aging Canadian Population by Robert L. Brown
SEDAP
A PROGRAM FOR RESEARCH ON
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS OF AN AGING
POPULATION
Economic Security in an Aging Canadian Population
Robert L. Brown
SEDAP Research Paper No. 285For further information about SEDAP and other papers in this series, see our web site: 
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/sedap
Requests for further information may be addressed to:
Secretary, SEDAP Research Program
Kenneth Taylor Hall, Room 426
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, L8S 4M4
FAX: 905 521 8232             e-mail: sedap@mcmaster.ca
July 2011
The Program for Research on Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population (SEDAP) is an
interdisciplinary research program centred at McMaster University with co-investigators at seventeen other
universities in Canada and abroad. The SEDAP Research Paper series provides a vehicle for distributing
the results of studies undertaken by those associated with the program. Authors take full responsibility for
all expressions of opinion. SEDAP has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council since 1999, under the terms of its Major Collaborative Research Initiatives Program. Additional
financial or other support is provided by the Canadian Institute for Health Information, the Canadian
Institute of Actuaries, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, ICES:
Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences, IZA: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (Institute
for the Study of Labour), SFI: The Danish National Institute of Social Research, Social Development
Canada, Statistics Canada, and participating universities in Canada (McMaster, Calgary, Carleton,
Memorial, Montréal, New Brunswick, Queen’s, Regina, Toronto, UBC, Victoria, Waterloo, Western, and
York) and abroad (Copenhagen, New South Wales, University College London).
Economic Security in an Aging Canadian Population
Robert L. Brown
SEDAP Research Paper No. 285Economic Security in an Aging Canadian Population  
Robert L. Brown  (Retired) 
Department of Statistics & Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo 
Abstract 
This paper has been written to bring up to date materials in a monograph that was a part of the Butterworths 
series of monographs in social gerontology, in particular, the 1991 monograph entitled:  Economic Security in an 
Aging Population (Brown, 1991). 
  
The paper reports on research that indicates that today’s retirees are doing very well in terms of their replacement 
ratios and that Canadian poverty rates among the elderly are low relative to OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries. 
 
Government-sponsored plans have been strengthened either through explicit expansion (e.g., the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement (GIS)) or through the reform of the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP).  Also important 
is the maturation of Employer-sponsored pension plans.  However, for the latter, coverage rates are down.   
 
This has created concern that future generations of Canadian retirees may not be able to experience the standard 
of living that is the reality for today’s elderly. 
 
The paper concludes that the aging of the population is not the cause of the increased cost of health care and 
social security today.  Even by 2031, when the entire baby boom will be aged 65+, the impact of population 
aging on costs will be manageable.  The paper also discusses the affordability of these systems if the normal age 
at retirement were to rise. 
 
Résumé 
Ce document a été écrit dans le but de mettre à jour le contenu d'une monographie faisant partie de la série de 
monographies Butterworths en gérontologie sociale, plus particulièrement, la monographie de 1991, intitulé La 
sécurité économique d'une population vieillissante (Brown, 1991). 
 
Ce document rend compte des recherches qui montrent que les retraités d'aujourd'hui sont très bien lotis en 
termes de taux de remplacement et que le taux de pauvreté des personnes âgées au Canada est faible par rapport 
aux autres membres de l'OCDE (Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques). 
 
Les plans de retraites publiques financés par le gouvernement ont été renforcés grâce à l'expansion soit explicite 
(par exemple, le Supplément de revenu garanti (SRG)) ou par le biais de la réforme des régimes de pensions du 
Canada / Québec (RPC / RRQ). De même, la maturation des régimes de retraites parrainées par les employeurs 
constitue aussi un élément important qu'il faut souligner. Malheureusement, le taux de couverture de ces derniers 
est en baisse. 
 
Cette situation a créé une inquiétude que les générations futures de retraités  canadiens ne seront pas en mesure 
de faire l'expérience du niveau de vie des personnes âgées d'aujourd'hui. 
 
Notre étude conclut que le vieillissement de la population n'est pas la cause de l'augmentation du coût des soins 
de santé et de la sécurité sociale aujourd'hui. Même en 2031, lorsque l'ensemble des baby-boomers seront âgés de 
65 ans et plus, l'impact du vieillissement de la population sur les coûts restera contrôlable. Le document aborde 
également l’accessibilité de ce système si l'âge normal de la retraite est revu à la hausse’. 
 
JEL Classification:  J18 
 
Key Words:  Baby boom, old age security, Canada/Quebec pension plans, registered pension      
  plans,  registered  retirement  savings plans, health care cost   2
1. Introduction 
 
In 1991, Butterworths, as part of their Perspectives on Individual and Population Aging series, 
published a volume entitled:  Economic Security in an Aging Population.  I was the sole author.  
Obviously, much has changed since 1991 including significant reform of the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plans.   
 
This paper updates the issues discussed in Economic Security in an Aging Population and 
provides more current data support.  This is done using sections that correspond to the chapters 
in the original publication.  
 
In particular, the paper investigates the cause of rising costs for health care and social security.  
For health care, it is shown that population aging is not the prime factor driving costs up (see 
Section 7).  For social security, because many of our social security benefits are indexed to cost-
of-living rather than wage growth, the rising costs will be manageable in a growing economy.  
Finally, it is shown that a modest increase in the normal age of retirement, along with growth in 
labour force productivity, would go a long way in stabilizing the demand for, versus the supply 
of, goods and services. 
 
2. Demographic  Background 
 
Canada’s shifting demographics are one of the important forces affecting (and effecting) the cost 
of our social support programs over the next half century.  This analysis is based on the 
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Source:  Statistics Canada (2008a), page 8 
 
It is popular to think of the baby boom as being a 1946 event.  However, as seen in Figure 1, the 
baby boom did not peak until 1959 (with live births of 479,000) and really did not end until 
around 1966.  
 
The fact that the baby boom is younger than popularly presented is both good news and bad 
news.  The good news is that there is still some time to adjust our systems (if necessary) to 
accommodate the baby boomers as they age.  The bad news is that if we think we have a crisis 
today, how will we manage the realities of the 2030s? 
 
There are actually two reasons for the current “population aging”.  The first is the demographic 
tidal wave of the baby boom/bust.  The second is ever improving life expectancies as illustrated 
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Figure 3:  Survivor Curves Canada 
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 Source:  CPP Office of the Chief Actuary, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
 




Life Expectancy in Canada 
 
Year    At  Birth    At  Age  65    At  Age  75 
  Male   Female Male   Female Male   Female 
 
1921   58.8   60.6   13.0   13.6       7.6       8.0 
1941   63.0   66.3   12.8   14.1       7.5       8.2 
1961   68.4   74.2   13.5   16.1       8.2       9.5 
1981   71.9   79.0   14.6   18.9       9.0   11.9 
2001   76.9   82.0   17.0   20.5   10.3   12.9 
2006   78.3   82.9   18.1   21.3   11.2   13.5 
 
Statistics Canada:  Life Tables, Canada and the Provinces, several 
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These two forces, in combination, result in the population aging illustrated in Table 2 and 
Figures 4-6.  In particular, if we compare the projected Canadian population in 2036 to the 
population as it existed at the time of the 1996 census, Table 2 shows that the proportion of the 
population aged 65+ will double and the proportion of the population 85+ will triple.  This is a 
combination of growth in those age groups and actual declines in the younger age groups (the 
baby bust). 
 
Even as the baby boom dies off, in the next half century, the proportion in the elderly age groups 
given for 2036 below will continue.  This is because of the impact of the anticipated continued 
improvement in life expectancy.  Thus, it isn’t so much that the baby boom caused population 
aging.  Rather the baby boom advanced the timing of the impact of population aging.   
 
Table 2:   Distribution of Canadian Population by Age-Group, 1956 to 2036 
 
Age    1956 1976 1996 2016 2036 
 
Under  20  39.4 35.6 26.7 21.1 20.2 
20-64    52.9 55.8 61.1 62.4 55.0 
65+      7.7    8.6  12.2  16.4  24.8 
 
75+      2.5    3.2    5.1    7.0  12.8 
85+      0.4    0.7    1.2    2.1    3.8 
 
Source:  Statistics Canada Population Projections 
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Dramatic changes are expected in the labour force.  For the first time in our history, more 
workers will be leaving the labour force through retirement than will be entering.  This will 
create some very important forces.  First, there will be pressure to keep workers in the labour 
force longer (e.g., by changing retirement incentives) and second, to fill the labour force 
shortages through immigration.  There are also some early indications that the fertility rate in 

































As stated, population aging will continue even after the disappearance of the baby boom because 




















Below we present the increase in the Aged Dependency Ratio (ADR) (defined as the number 
aged 65+ per unit of labour force) as we move from a base year of 2005 to 2050.  From these 
data, we can see that on an international comparison, Canada faces a dramatic demographic shift.     
 
 
Table 3:  Aged Dependency Ratios, And Growth Therein, 2050 versus 2005 
  
  Country  ADR 2005 (%)  ADR 2050 (%)  Increase (%) 
 
 Japan    30    76             153.3 
 Canada  19    45             136.8 
 Italy    30    64             113.3 
  France     25      47           88.0 
  US      19      34           78.9 
  UK      24      38           58.3 
  Sweden    26      40           53.8 
 
Source:  U.N. data, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A44  
 
Of the countries listed, Canada has the second most-dramatic aging increase (after only Japan) 
with a much more rapid shift than in the United States.  This is because of the more dramatic   12
shift in our fertility rates.  Today, The U.S. has a fertility rate of 2.1 (which means that their 
population will replace itself without in-migration) while ours is 1.6 (which is well below the 
replacement rate).  Similarly, Canada experiences much more of an age shift than more mature 
societies in Europe (e.g., Sweden).  In fact, it is probably true that if Sweden can afford its 
support systems today, then it faces a very small increase in financing over the next half century.  
 
Sections 7 and 8 discuss the impact these rapidly shifting demographics may have on Canadian 
economic security programs, including social security and health care. 
 
 
3.  Income Patterns of the Elderly 
 
Canada’s retirement income support system is referred to as a three-legged stool.   
 
The first leg of the stool is government-sponsored social security systems that include Old Age 
Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and the Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plans (C/QPP).  OAS and GIS are funded through general tax revenues while the C/QPP are 
funded by mandatory contributions.  These systems will be defined in detail in Section 4. 
 
The second tier of the provision of retirement income security is employer-sponsored pension 
plans.  As will be seen in Section 5, these plans can be either Defined Benefit (DB) or Defined 
Contribution (DC) plans.  DB plan coverage has been declining and now sits at 38.5 percent of 
the employed labour force.  However, coverage is only 25 percent for workers in the private 
sector.  Employer sponsored pension plans are discussed in detail in Section 5. 
 
Finally, we have tax-incented individual savings plans which include Registered Retirement 
Savings Plans (RRSPs) and Tax Free Savings Accounts (TFSAs) introduced in 2008.  These are 
very important sources of retirement income especially for those without an employer-sponsored 
pension plan as will be seen later in this section.  RRSPs and TFSAs will be discussed in detail in 
Section 6. 
  
We are fortunate that the current debate on pension reform has created a number of excellent 
reports providing information about income and expenditure patterns of the elderly.  These 
include the report of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions (OECP, 2008) plus the follow-
up supplement by Bob Baldwin (2009), the Jack Mintz (2009) report to the Ministers of Finance 
(based on six research papers) and a report comparing Canada’s economic security systems to 
those of other OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) nations by 
Whitehouse (2009).  In general, these reports state that the present Canadian system in total (i.e., 
social security plus private pension plans plus RRSP/TFSAs) is, in fact, doing a good job in 
providing Canadians with retirement income security. 
 
It is worth noting that Canadians now receive larger benefits from our social security systems 
than historically.  This is because of the maturation of the C/QPPs and also increases in the GIS 
(see Figure 7). 
 




Office of the Chief Actuary, Canada Pension Plan, 2010 
 




Mintz (2009) reports that Canada has one of the lower poverty rates among elders within the 
OECD countries.  Whitehouse (2009) confirms this by stating that in  the  mid‐2000s,  13.3 
percent of those 65+ were income poor on average in OECD countries.  The old‐age poverty 
rate was just 4.4 percent in Canada, the fifth lowest among the thirty OECD countries.   He 




Whitehouse  (ibid)  also  points  out  that  Canada  has  strongly  progressive  mandatory 







calculate  a  replacement  ratio  including  the  ratio  of  gross  income  before  and  after 
retirement, net income (consumable income) before and after retirement, income adjusted 






Baldwin (2009) points out that while pension coverage rates are trending downward, more 
Canadian workers than ever have pension coverage.  This anomaly is explained by the rapid 
increase in size of the Canadian labour force.  The latter is explained largely by the continued 
rise in female labour force participation rates (in the period from the mid-1990s to 2007, the 
percentage of women receiving C/QPP benefits has increased from 70 to 84 percent while the 
percentage with 3
rd pillar (Employment pensions, called Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) + 
RRSPs) income has increased from 34 to 55 percent).  So more Canadians than ever have 
pensions (in fact, 5,900,000), but because the labour force is growing faster than the number of 
workers with pensions, the pension coverage rate is down.  It is also true that private sector DB 
coverage is down.  These data do not include Group RRSPs, which is a growing vehicle for 
employers to provide employees with pension benefits. 
 
Further, Baldwin points out that with the increased female labour force participation rates, “no 
coverage” families are not increasing in numbers.  One should also take into consideration 
pension splitting on divorce and survivor benefits in retirement in determining pension coverage 
rates. 
 
Finally, Baldwin states that just because a worker does not have 3
rd pillar coverage at a particular 
time does not mean that s/he will acquire no pension benefits over the working lifetime.  
Workers move from job to job.  Some jobs have pensions and some do not.  So, it is quite likely 
that the coverage rate at a given moment provides an imperfect indication of how many 
Canadians retire with some pension benefits. 
 
Whitehouse (2009) notes that in Canada, coverage of private pensions increases strongly 






As to replacement ratios, Baldwin quotes a longitudinal study by LaRochelle-Cote, Myles and 
Picot (Statistics Canada, 2008b) that indicates a median replacement rate that holds level by age 
at about 80 percent (see details of this study below).   This study does note that within different 
income quintiles there are significant differences in replacement ratios, however.  Data from the   15
Mintz Report (2009) suggest that one fifth of Canadians may not have sufficient RPP and RRSP 
assets to replace at least 90 percent of their pre-retirement consumption. 
 









Finally, both Mintz (2009) and Whitehouse (2009) note that Canadians are, by and large, 
doing relatively well in ensuring that they have adequate savings for their retirement.  The 
OECD suggests the Canadian retirement income system performs exceedingly well by 
international standards, with the three pillars enabling Canadians to provide enough retirement 
income to sustain an adequate standard of living in retirement without unduly affecting 
incentives for people to work and save.  Whitehouse (ibid) notes that Canada’s mixed system of 




Some very recent evidence has shown (perhaps surprisingly) that Canadians with RPPs have 
somewhat less retirement income than those without RPPs because those without a RPP tend to 
have other assets to support their retirement and are more likely to work after age 65. 
 




d.  Cost of administration 
 




The  main  issue  in  Canada  is  the  scale  of  administrative  charges f o r  p e r s o n a l  p e n s i o n s  
(RRSPs).  Information provided suggests that many RRSPs have charges of 2 percent of 
assets per year, or even more.  These higher‐cost options tend to be actively managed, 
individual  RRSPs.    Nevertheless,  there  are  lower  cost  options.   F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n v e s t i n g  
through indexed rather than actively‐managed funds involves typically only around half 








Mintz' research suggests that active management does not provide returns on a persistent basis 
any better than passive management for both pension plans and mutual funds.  Once taking into 
account active management costs, passive managed assets would provide superior returns.  
Individual investors do not seem to be advised sufficiently to invest in indexed and exchange-
traded funds to improve fund performance. 
 
 
  e.  Sources of Income 
 
Baldwin (2009) indicates that the retirement income that Canadians receive today (including 
OAS and C/QPP) is up significantly from previous years.  This is partially because of the 
maturation of the C/QPP and improvement in OAS/GIS benefits (see Figure 7) but RPPs are also 
a part of this improvement.  In the period from 1976 to 2007, for couples, real incomes increased 
by 55 percent.  For singles, the real increase was 79 percent.  For couples at the 5
th percentile 
their income was up 99 percent.  For those at the 95
th percentile, it was up 28 percent.  For 
singles, the comparable numbers were 140 percent and 79 percent.  
 
The sources of income have changed remarkably over the years. 
 
Table 4 
Percentage of Income from Various Sources for those 65+ 
 
 Source    1971   1985   1996   2001 
      Male  Female     Male  Female   Male Female   Male     Female 
Private Pensions  
And RRSPs    16.5     8.6       20.5       9.0        32.9     18.6       36.3  23.4 
C/QPP       2.2     1.1       15.5     10.1        20.9     18.3       21.2       20.3 
OAS/GIS    29.3      60.5         26.1     45.2        20.7     36.7       19.3       34.3 
Investment    20.5      19.7         21.2     28.0        12.1     17.4       10.7       14.0 
Other*     31.6      10.1         16.8       7.8        13.4       9.0       12.5         8.0 
 
Source:  Statistics Canada 1988 and Edward Tamagno, 2006. 
 
* “Other” includes work earnings. 
 
The increased importance of the C/QPP should not be surprising given it is now fully mature and 
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Table 5 
 
C/QPP Contributors by Sex 
(As a percentage of those aged 20-64) 
 
   Y e a r    F e m a l e s   M a l e s  
      1971       48.0       95.8 
      1981       64.0       94.3 
      1991       66.7       82.6 
      2001       70.8       82.5 
      2007       73.8       82.6 
 
Source:  Office of the Chief Actuary, Canada Pension Plan (personal memo) 
 
One can also see the improved provision of retirement income from RPPs and RRSPs.  
 
Horner (2009) states that in 2006, among 19.8 million tax filers under age 65, those belonging to 
an RPP and/or an RRSP totaled 8.7 million, or 43 percent.  However, if one considers only those 
tax filers who clearly do need private savings to maintain their living standards in retirement—
the 8 million C/QPP contributors with incomes over $30,000—one finds that 6.9 million, or 86.6 
percent were RPP/RRSP savers.  
 
LaRochelle-Cote, Myles and Picot (Statistics Canada 2008b) report that workers with average 
income, post-retirement income stabilizes at approximately 80 percent of their income level at 
age 55 (see Figure 8).  Low-income individuals (those in the bottom income quintile) experience 
little change in income largely because of the income maintenance effects of the public pension 
system.  Individuals in the top quintile experience substantially larger income declines in 
retirement so that income inequality within a cohort declines with retirement.  More recent 
groups of retirees are experiencing higher income levels than earlier cohorts, largely because of 
higher private pensions.  Whether this trend will continue is questionable since pension coverage 





















4.  Government Sponsored Income Security 
 
It is well documented that the primary drivers in the cost of an aging population supported by 
public financing are social security and health care (see for example, Fellegi (1988) or Denton, 
Feaver and Spencer (2005)).  Research has shown that the cost of these programs will grow with 
the size of Canada’s aging population (Denton, Feaver and Spencer (2005)).  Unfortunately, the 
proportion of working-age adults will concurrently shrink, and there will be fewer shoulders to 
support the growing expense as seen in Figure 5.   
 
We will analyze two publicly sponsored (and, except for the C/QPP also publicly financed) 
systems in the order:  social security (in this section) and then health care (in Section 7). 
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Social Security:  OAS/GIS and the C/QPPs 
 
Figure 7 showed that government-sponsored retirement income security benefits have improved 
over time, especially the targeted GIS benefit. For singles in 2011, the maximum average OAS 
benefit was $6291, the maximum GIS was $7940 and the total maximum GIS and OAS benefit 
was $14,231.  In 2011, however, the maximum OAS and GIS benefit would not raise elderly 
Canadians above their basic needs as defined by the Low Income Cut-Off (LICO) or the Low 
Income Measure (LIM). Similarly, OAS and GIS alone would also not meet the needs of either 
the “Typical” or “No Assets” single (the deficiency ranging up to $6,744 for a typical single 
living in Toronto).  The maximum C/QPP retirement benefit in 2011 was $11,520 per annum.  
All of these pension benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
 
Under OAS, all persons in Canada aged 65 or over, who are citizens or legal residents, qualify 
for either a full or partial OAS pension.  In general, those with 40 years of residence after age 18 
are eligible for a full pension.  Those with fewer than 40 years may receive a partial pension on a 
prorated basis (t/40) provided they have at least ten years residence.  OAS benefits are paid out 
of general tax revenues and are taxable income.  
 
Prior to 1989, OAS was universal for those 65 years of age and over, subject only to residence 
requirements with no income or asset tests. However, in 1989, the government introduced 
measures to “clawback” the OAS benefit from recipients with net income over $62,310 (2011) a 
year at a rate of 15 cents for every dollar that net income exceeds $62,310.  Seniors with net 
incomes of $109,000 or more get no OAS.  
 
GIS was introduced in 1966 at the time of the inception of the C/QPP as a temporary measure to 
cover the ten year transition period to full C/QPP benefits and provides income-tested benefits 
for the elderly poor.  GIS is still with us (in an expanded version) and remains an essential 
element of the government income security system.   
 
For a single pensioner, the maximum GIS is reduced by $1 for each $2 of income (other than 
OAS) but with some exemptions, such as the first $3500 of income from employment and any 
income from TFSAs.  The GIS stops being paid when income reaches $38,110 for an individual 
There is no asset test for the GIS. 
 
GIS payments are financed by general tax revenues;  no contributions are required.  GIS benefits 
are nontaxable, although those eligible for GIS would not pay much tax anyway.  Currently one-
third of Canadians receive at least a partial GIS. 
 
GIS benefit levels have been increased several times since its inception (see Figure 7), and it is 
now a significant part of the retirement income security system in Canada.  However, as income 
from the C/QPP and private pensions has grown, the proportion of seniors receiving GIS has 
fallen.  OAS/GIS currently provides $33 billion in benefits per year to 4.5 million Canadians 
(Department of Finance, 2010). 
 
The second tier of government-sponsored retirement income benefits is the mandatory 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP).  These plans are virtually identical.   There exists full   20
mobility of ‘pension credits’ between the two plans. The C/QPP are contributory DB plans 
introduced in 1966.    Full benefits were first paid in 1976.  While their main benefit is retirement 
income (70 percent of cash flow) the plan also pays benefits for Disability and Death, plus 
Children’s, Orphans’ and Survivors’ Benefits.  For full information on all benefits see 
http://www.sdc.gc.ca/en/isp/pub/factsheets/rates.shtml. 
 
Contributions to the C/QPP total 9.9 percent of earnings between the Year’s Basic Exemption 
(YBE which equals $3500 constant)) and the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE = 
$48,300 in 2011) meant to approximate the average wage (and indexed to the average wage).  
Contributions are shared equally between employers and employees (4.95 percent each).  The 
self-employed pay the full 9.9 percent.  Starting in 2012, if a ‘retired’ Canadian who is receiving 
the CPP returns to work that person (and his/her employer) will restart payment of CPP 
contributions and earn additional benefits (this has been the case for the QPP since 1998). 
 
The retirement benefit equals 25 percent of the worker’s Career Average Earnings indexed to the 
average wage.  To get a full benefit, a worker would need to have 40 years of contributions.  
There are special ‘drop-out’ years allowed for years of disability and child rearing that qualify so 
long as the years of earnings are ultimately not less than ten.  Benefits are taxable income. There 
is no income or asset test for the receipt of C/QPP benefits.  The full benefit is payable at age 65.  
However, the plans allow flexible retirement between ages 60 and 70.  For both early and late 
retirement, there is a permanent adjustment in benefits equal to 0.5 percent per month (at the 
time of writing).  That is, someone retiring at age 60 would get 70 percent of a full benefit, while 
someone retiring at age 70 would get 130 percent.  Amendments to increase these adjustments 
have been announced. 
 
Recent actuarial valuations of the CPP (OSFI, 2010) show that the plan is viable for a 75-year 
time horizon.  Because of less favorable demographics (lower fertility, immigration and wage 
growth) the QPP may require future adjustments. 
 
In total, these systems are highly progressive.  This means that above-average wage earners need 
to supplement their government benefits with private savings (RPPs or RRSPs). 
 
The public pension combination of OAS/GIS/CPP by itself achieves high earnings replacement 
rates for low-income Canadians.  For example, a couple, both aged sixty-five, with maximum 
government pension benefits, receives an inflation-indexed annuity of $34,218.  (Ambachtsheer, 
2009). 
 
The C/QPP experienced significant reforms in 1997.  The major reason for this was the 
economic and political climate.  In the early 1990s, Canadian governments (both federal and 
provincial) were running deficits.  The federal deficit peaked at $40 billion in 1993 with  35 
percent of federal revenue being spent on interest on the debt (Brown, 1999, p12).  The 
government was also concerned about the expected rise in social security costs that population 
aging would create as presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
 
Projected Net (After Taxes) Costs of OAS/GIS ($B) 
 
1996 2001 2011 2030 
 
20.8 24.7 34.4 77.3 
 
Government of Canada, 1996b, p34 
 
The final reasons for the timing of the reforms were actuarial in nature.  The C/QPPs were 
created in 1966.  For the early cohorts of workers, contributions to the plans totaled 3.6 percent 
of contributory wages. This contribution rate remained unchanged until the mid 1980s.  Even 
with this low rate, the C/QPPs were able to build up reserve funds equal to two-year’s 
expenditures.  However, by the mid-1980s the reserve funds were being depleted and were 
destined for exhaustion by 2016.  Further, C/QPP actuarial reports indicated that contribution 
rates would have to rise to 14.2 percent if no changes were made (OSFI 15
th CPP Actuarial 
Report, 1994).  At first, the government reacted solely with gradual ad hoc increases in the 
contribution rate.  By 1997, the combined contribution rate was 6 percent (3 percent from the 
worker and 3 percent from the employer). 
 
In March 1996, the government announced the most fundamental amendments to social security 
in Canada since 1966.   
 
First, it proposed that OAS and GIS be replaced by a new Seniors Benefit.  The government said 
that this action was necessary to make OAS/GIS sustainable.  The new benefit would be 
nontaxable income and be fully indexed to inflation.  The clawback of the Seniors Benefit would 
have been based on the combined income of spouses (as is the case for GIS;  however the OAS 
clawback is currently based on individual income). 
 
Analysts of the proposed system criticized the high total marginal tax rates that resulted.  If the 
marginal clawback and marginal income taxes were added together then some seniors would lose 
78 percent of every dollar of their private income.  It was argued that these rates would create a 
significant disincentive to save for retirement.  
 
The other flaw in the Seniors Benefit was that the clawback was based on family income and not 
individual income (as under OAS).  Thus, older women who never participated in the paid labor 
force would no longer have any retirement income in their own right and would lose that aspect 
of economic autonomy in their spousal relationship.  This was a deciding factor in the death of 
the Seniors Benefit proposal and a flaw that the government appeared to have underestimated. 
 
Returning to the reforms of the C/QPP, in 1997, the Minister of Finance announced that the 
government had an agreement with the provinces to amend the CPP.  This was not easy since 
any changes to the CPP needs the support of 2/3 of the provinces with 2/3 of the total Canadian 
population (including Quebec).  This makes radical reform difficult.  
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In introducing the reforms to the Canadian public, the government stressed arguments of 
“affordability” and “sustainability”.   
 
“The changes will ensure that the CPP is affordable to future generations and can be 
sustained in the face of an aging population, increasing longevity, and the retirement of 
the baby boom generation”  (Canada 1997, p6) 
 
The 1997 reforms to the C/QPP should be categorized as tweaks to the existing system as 
opposed to major reforms.  However, several amendments were announced that decreased the 
benefits to be paid in the future (by about 9.3 percent in total), increased the level of funding and 
increased the rate of return on any reserve funds.  One example was a change in the value of the 
CPP death benefit.  Prior to amendment, this benefit was equal to six months of retirement 
benefits, to a maximum of 10 percent of the YMPE.  In 1997, the YMPE was $35,800 so the 
maximum death benefit then was $3580.  The 1997 reforms set a new maximum death benefit of 
$2500 that does not adjust to inflation. 
 
A further feature of the 1997 reforms was the introduction of an automatic balancing mechanism.  
The CPP is supposed to be sustainable with a 9.9 percent contribution rate.  If the CPP actuary 
shows that the present benefits cannot be sustained at 9.9 percent and no political solution is 
found, then two things happen.  First, the contribution rate moves half of the distance to the 
necessary long-term contribution rate as determined by the CPP actuary.  At the same time, 
benefits are de-indexed to bring them slowly down in value until the new (slightly higher) 
contribution rate is in balance with the new (slightly lower) benefits.  Thus, sustainability is 
guaranteed and is achieved by adjustments to both benefits and contributions. 
 
Further, the C/QPP contributions were increased rapidly to 9.9 percent in 2003, with a resultant 
rapid increase in the reserve funds. Until 1997, the CPP reserve funds were lent to the provincial 
governments.  The new reserve funds are invested by an independent ‘Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board’ (CPPIB).  The CPPIB is subject to broadly the same investment rules as 
pension funds in the private sector.  Based on the latest (25
st) CPP Actuarial Report (OSFI, 
2010), CPP contributions are expected to exceed benefits until 2020, providing a 10-year period 
before any portion of the investment income is needed to help pay CPP benefits. 
 
The reforms of 1997 have meant that the CPP now rests on a healthy foundation.  So healthy, in 
fact, that one of the strongest proposals for pension reform in Canada, at this time, is to expand 
the C/QPP.  This could be done in one of two ways.  First, one could increase the 25 percent 
benefit rate now in place.  This proposal is somewhat controversial since poorer Canadians 
would have to pay increased contributions to the C/QPP, but their increased benefits would be 
offset by a decrease in their GIS benefits leading to a regressive system.  The other expansion 
that has been put forth is to raise the YMPE from its current level of  $48,300 so that more of a 
worker’s earnings would be covered by the C/QPP resulting in larger benefits (without poorer 
workers paying more).  No resolution of this debate has been achieved as yet. 
 
In summary, the Canadian social security system provides Canadians with a high level of income 
security while still leaving ample room for individual savings and investments (see Brown and 
Prus, 2004). 
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5.  Employer-Sponsored Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) 
 
 
As noted in the Baldwin (2009) report, the private pension coverage rate (through RPPs) has 
been steadily falling.  What might have caused this to occur? 
 
The OECP, (2008) did extensive research on this question and concluded that, at least for 
Ontario, there were three reasons for the decline in the coverage rate.  First, union density is 






Source, Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, 2008, p44.   
 
This is important.  Whereas 76 percent of unionized workers are members of occupational 
pension plans, only 28 percent of non-union workers have this coverage.  The OECP stated that 
declining union density alone seems to account for 40 percent of the decline in pension coverage 
for men and young women (ibid, p45) 
 
Another reason is the decline in larger workplaces as smaller employers become more important.  
In workplaces with more than 1,000 employees, pension coverage runs at about 60 percent, 
whereas for workers in small enterprises (with fewer than 20 employees) the coverage rate is 10 
percent (ibid, p39). 
 
















































































Source: PPIC, CANSIM 279-025 and 282-0078  24
The final reason is the decline of the manufacturing sector, especially the auto sector.  Large 
manufacturers have historically been associated with both high rates of unionization and pension 
coverage. 
 
There is a significant difference in pension coverage between the public and private sectors.  
About 78 percent of public sector workers had pension coverage in 2005, while the comparable 
rate for the private sector was 25 percent (ibid). 
 
Another important statistic is that pension coverage rates for men and women are now virtually 
identical (ibid, p40). 
 
Population aging also puts increased pressure on pension plans in at least two ways.  First, as the 
ratio of retirees to workers increases, the volatility of the cost of the plan increases (payment of 
benefits is more dependent on investment returns versus worker contributions).  Second, as 
retirement life expectancy improves, the cost of pension benefits rises proportionately. 
 
As noted previously by Whitehouse, relative to many OECD countries, Canada’s public 
retirement income programs are quite modest.  As a result, occupational pension plans and other 
forms of private savings play a more important role in providing retirement income security and 
in achieving a suitable replacement ratio.  No jurisdiction that uses a voluntary private pension 
system has ever had coverage rates in excess of 50 percent (ibid, p30).  In Canada, only 38.5 
percent of the paid labour force is now covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan. 
 
As noted previously, average retirement incomes and replacement ratios have improved since the 
early 1970s.  However, the experience of different groups of retirees varies widely.  For 
example, longitudinal studies show that Ontario retirees in the most affluent quintile rely on 
occupational plans and private savings for 41 percent of their income and on public plans for 
only 16 percent.  By contrast, retirees in the poorest quintile receive 57 percent of their income 
from the public system and only 21 percent from RPPs and RRSPs.  Only about 25 percent of 
families in the poorest quintile had a RPP, and only 2 percent of families in this group had two, 
whereas 40 percent of top-quintile earners had two RPPs (ibid, p31).  These inequalities are 
increasing. 
 
The next generation may not reach the high replacement ratios achieved by today’s retirees.  
Horner (2009) says that trends such as increasing life expectancy, declining investment returns 
and a continuing decline in private pension coverage threaten the retirement income security of 
modest and middle-income earners.   
 
A recent paper from Statistics Canada (Ostrovsky and Schellenberg, 2009a) indicates that 
retirees who do not have a RPP in their fifties were, on average, achieving the same income 
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6.  Individual Savings and RRSPs 
 
In a paper for the C. D. Howe Institute, Dodge, Laurin and Busby (2010) calculate that a worker 
aged thirty who earns an inflation-adjusted $60,000 per year over thirty-five years will have to 
save about fourteen percent of pay to achieve a seventy percent earnings replacement ratio 
(including the public OAS/CPP pensions).  The required savings rate drops to eleven percent for 
a sixty percent earnings replacement ratio, and further to nine percent if the worker retires at age 
sixty-seven rather than sixty-five.  There is a growing understanding that seventy percent is 
unnecessarily high for many people, and that sixty, or even fifty percent may be more 
appropriate in many cases (Chevreau, 2007). Studies suggest that Canadians (either individually 
or through employer plans) are currently saving far less than they need to save to provide for 
pensions approaching 70 percent—or even 60 percent—of pre-retirement earnings (Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries, 2007). 
 
In 2006, approximately 9 million Canadians saved in an RPP and/or RRSP, and 3.6 million 
Canadians received income from a RPP and/or RRIF (Department of Finance, Canada, 2010).  
At the end of December 2009, Canadians had assets of $1.9 trillion in RPPs and RRSPs (Dodge 
et al., 2010)). 
 
The new TFSA was introduced by the government in 2008.  Under the TFSA, contributions can 
be made (up to $5000 a year) out of after tax income.  Investment income then accrues tax free.  
When funds are taken from the TFSA, no new taxes arise.  There is also no impact on the ability 
of an individual to qualify for the OAS/GIS because of income from a TFSA.  It has been 
reported that Canadians opened up 4.7 million TFSAs by the end of December 2009.  The value 
of the TFSA assets amounted to about $15.8 billion (ibid). 
 
7.  Economic Security Aspects of Health Care 
 
The second force driving up publicly financed costs as the population ages is Canadian health 
care.  Canada now spends more than 10 percent of (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health 
care.  Health care represents 42 percent of the Ontario budget.  The expectation of rising health 
care costs in an aging population is a logical occurrence given that older Canadians cost our 
health care system more than younger Canadians (see Figure 10) and, therefore, if the population 
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Source:  Marshall, 1987. 
 
 
However, a variety of other opinions exist in the literature as to why health care costs are 
increasing and expected to continue to increase.  For example, Brown and Suresh (2004) point 
out that it is more correct to say that health care costs are a function of the year of death rather 
than age.  It is the high expenditures on health care just prior to death that drives health care 
spending, not the pure age of the population (old patients who continue to survive do not cost us 
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Table 7 
Cost Ratio:  Died*/Survived Costs of Medical and Social Care by Age 
 
 Age  Band   Cost  Ratio:  Died*/Survived 
       65      16.7 
 75-76          8.4 
 85-87          3.8 
 90-93          2.5 
 *   Last six months of life 
 
Source:  McGrail et al. (2000) 
 
This is important.  Health care is funded on a pay-as-you-go basis.  Thus, as life expectancy 
improves, increased health care costs (if they are a function of time-at-death) are delayed.  But 
costs delayed actually decrease the funding needed in any year to support the system. 
  
Regardless of the arguments in the literature, hardly a week goes by without another article in the 
media about the pending health care cost crisis  (see for example, The Globe and Mail, 2010).  
Normally, these commentaries are couched in a context of population aging.  In fact, we know 
that population aging per se accounts for very little of the increase in health care costs in the 
recent past and it will not be the key driving force over the next three decades (Evans et al, 
2001).  This myth that population aging is the key factor in rising health care costs is used by 
those who seek more funding for their part of the system.  It is a convenient factor since the 
system has no control over it (“it is not our fault”).   McIntyre et al. (2003) projected real growth 
in health care costs of 2.6 percent per annum made up of 0.9 percent for increased per capita 
consumption/service levels, 0.9 percent for general population growth, and 0.8 percent 
attributable to population aging. 
 
Figure 11 shows that what is driving increased health care costs is increased servicing (heavier, 
more intense treatment), for all age groups, but especially for the elderly, rather than population 
aging.  And this is happening without any evidence of increased needs.  These results strongly 
suggest that changes in utilization patterns are motivated by changing clinical standards of 
investigation and intervention.  The problems and the outcomes themselves appear to be 
unchanged over the period of observation (ibid).  Such changes are common in most 










































The estimates of the impact of aging on per capita total health costs in Canada (in real terms, net 
of inflation), for the whole population, generally place it at about 1 per cent per capita per year 
(Barer et al, 1998).  Barer et al. are famous for asking if the impending health care “crisis” is an 
avalanche or a glacier. It has been noted that even a sustained trend of low economic growth 
would enable us to support an expansion of health care services adequate to satisfy the needs 
associated purely with the aging of the population (see also Marzouk (1991) and Sepehri and 
Chernomas (2004)). 
 











Resources and Health Indicators, 2006 
 
Country Health  Expenditure  Life Expectancy  Infant Mortality 
    (Percentage of GDP)     at birth    per 100 live births 
 
Canada  10.0             80.7   5.0 
France    11.0             80.7   3.8 
Japan        8.1         82.4      2.6 
UK        8.5         79.5      5.0 
US    15.8             78.1   6.7 
 
Source:  www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3443,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
To close, more research needs to be done to identify procedures that truly improve health 
outcomes for the elderly.  Just spending more dollars on health care does not necessarily result in 
improved health. 
 
8.  Future Funding of Social Security 
 
Prior to 2011, a quick review of Figure 12 may have led one to assume that our shifting 
demographics would cause no problems in total since increasing aged dependency ratios appear 
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Figure 12 
Source:  Author’s calculation using statistics from Brown and Bilodeau, 1999 
 
 
Unfortunately, transfers of wealth to educate and provide health care to the young are not equal 
to the transfer of wealth required for health care and retirement income security for the elderly.  
Analysis (e.g., Foot 1982) has shown that government expenditures on the elderly are about 2.5 
times those for the young (per capita) (see also CANSIM Tables 051-0001 (1971 to 2008) and 
052-0004 (2009 to 2056)).  Therefore, any analysis that attempts to derive a formula for future 
wealth transfers must include the lower demands by the youth sector and also the differing 
transfer factors for the young versus the elderly. 
 
Such an analysis, using Canadian data, is found in Brown and Bilodeau (1997).  The authors 
developed a statistic called the Wealth-Transfer Index (WTI) defined as: 
 
WTI = [(1.866 x Y) + (1 x U) + (4.636 x A)] / LF 
 
  Y   =  Youth, 0-19 
  U   =  those Unemployed   31
  A   =  Aged, 65 and over 
  LF =  the projected employed Labour Force 
 
The weights of 1.866, 1 and 4.636 were derived by McDonald and Carty (1980, pp. 16-17). No 
more recent analysis is available. Note that 4.636/1.866 = 2.48 (close to 2.50) which lends more 
credibility to the analysis.  These weights do not have any meaning by themselves—they are 
only weights relative to a weight of ‘1’ for unemployed adults.  These weights are based on 
payments for health care, education, unemployment transfers and retirement income security 
made by any level of government.  While this does not represent the totality of dependencies, it 
does capture the key macro-indicators.  The WTI statistic is a single indicator of the supply of 
(denominator) and demand for (numerator) wealth.  As shown in Figure 13, the WTI actually 
trended downward from 1991 to 2006.  After 2006, it increases rapidly as the population ages 
and, in particular, as the baby boom  retires and the labour force turns to the baby bust generation 
for wealth creation (mostly after 2011). 
 
Figure 13:  Wealth Transfer Index, 1975 to 2041 
Source:  Brown and Bilodeau, 1999. 
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Brown, Damm and Sharara (2000) show that we can keep the WTI constant at its 2006 level by 
raising the age at which people retire.  This would move Canadians out of the ‘dependent’ 
numerator and into the ‘productive’ denominator.  Even with no productivity improvements the 
needed shift is small as can be seen in Figure 14.  With productivity improvement, the shift is 
smaller still (ibid). 
 
 


























According to Felligi (1988) and Denton, Feaver and Spencer (2005), social security appears to be 
our primary source of rising expenses as the population ages. Canada does not have, however, an 
overly generous social security system relative to most European countries.  
 
Figures 15, and 16 illustrate the focusing of benefits.  In Figure 15, we can see that all Canadians 
receive very similar dollar benefits in total from the government-sponsored system.  As you 
move through the wage sectors, one finds that new dollars of CPP are offset first by the GIS 

























Source:  Chisholm and Brown, 2008 
 
As stated, Canadian retirement income support is highly targeted on the poor.  This is reinforced 

















































































































































































































































































While social security costs will rise over the next half century, they seem to be within affordable 
levels.  OAS and GIS are indexed to prices (CPI) while taxes rise with earnings.  In a normal 
economy, wages rise faster than prices so that the tax rate needed to fund OAS/GIS does not rise 
as quickly as the rate of growth of benefits.  According to the 8
th Actuarial Report of the Old Age 
Security Program (OSFI, 2008), while OAS (including GIS) expenditures will rise from $33B in 
2007 to $110B in 2030, the ratio of expenditures to the GDP increases from 2.2 percent in 2007 
to a high of 3.1 percent in 2030.  The ratio then reduces to 2.7 percent by 2050. 
 
As already outlined, the C/QPP were significantly reformed in 1997. As a result of these 
amendments, there now exists a $109B fund within the CPP.   While the fund lost $13.8B in 
2008, it has still returned 5.1 percent per annum since its inception in 1999.  
 
Further, every CPP actuarial report, since its reform, has indicated that the 9.9 percent 
contribution rate will sustain the projected benefits for at least 75-years (OSFI, 2010).   
(Unfortunately, as previously stated, the same is not true for the QPP.) 
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9. Conclusion 
 
Many things have changed since the publication in 1991 of the monograph:  Economic Security 
in an Aging Canadian Population.  Some events have been distinct and abrupt such as the major 
amendments made to the C/QPP in 1997.  Others have been more gradual and not as distinctive.  
These include the general aging of the population and continuing increases in health care costs.  
Finally, the literature on the impacts of population aging has grown exponentially. 
 
This paper has reviewed many of the public policy issues associated with population aging in 
Canada.  As a generalization (and consistent with the 1991 monograph), the literature tells us 
that population aging, by itself, will not create overwhelming burdens on the Canadian taxpayer 
even as the baby boom generation moves out of the labour force and into retirement. As one 
example, Section 7 showed that population aging is not the major driving force today behind 
rising health care costs. 
 
However, it is true that the costs of social security and health care will both rise as the population 
ages.  It is only because the Canadian financial security safety net is relatively meager that costs 
will remain sustainable.  This is true because OAS (including GIS) is indexed to CPI rather than 
wages so should decline in importance over time as a percentage of GDP (see Section 4).   
Further, the 1997 amendments to the C/QPP have placed them on a much firmer foundation and 
public faith in these two plans has broadened significantly as result.   
 
Finally, it has also been shown that even a modest increase in the normal retirement age along 
with modest increases in workplace productivity would go a long way in stabilizing the 
sustainability of our support systems.  A later retirement age seems to be a current focus in terms 
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